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Abstract
Information asymmetry is a common feature that hinders lending to small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). In the last decade, the growth in Islamic banks lending to SMEs was
overwhelming to the extent that it prompted practitioners to regard this as a“ win-win”
situation. Unlike a conventional bank that mainly resorts to relationship banking to SMEs,
an Islamic bank uses a Murabaha contract that creates a “collateral-by-contract” to the
borrower. Such distinct lending approaches by the two types of banks have an implication
on banks’ cost curves that arise from differences in monitoring cost. In this article, we develop
a two-stage competition model to investigate the growth in SMEs lending by Islamic banks.
In our theoretical model, Islamic and conventional banks compete with prices at the first
stage (Bertrand framework) and with loan output at the second stage (Cournot framework).
Our result reveal that in price competition an Islamic bank will gain market share initially
due to its differentiated product. However, in the second stage, the amount of lending to
SMEs by Islamic banks decreases due to market share competition.
1 Introduction
There is substantial evidence in the literature that access to finance by small and medium
enterprise (SMEs) is vital for SMEs to eliminate hurdles to growth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt,
2006). A number of factors including information asymmetry, lack of collateral and inexperienced
management are significant challenges to SMEs access to external funds (among others Shaban
et al, 2014; Owualah, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Banks as financial intermediaries are
expected to be one of the main providers of funds to SMEs, in the similar way that they provide
lending to households, government entities and large corporations. To supply lending to various
customer categories, banks incur costs in establishing lending systems and processes in place.
For example, it is commonly known that banks adopt hard information (financial statement
analysis) to lend to corporates. On the other hand, they use soft information (relationship
banking) lending to SMEs. Serving these two types of customer categories simultaneously have
significant implications on bank costs and organisational structure. The elevation in banks costs
due to the adoption or expansion in relationship banking is one of the key factors that hinder
banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs (Berger and Udell, 2002).
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The strand of literature comparing between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of SMEs
lending is scarce in general. More importantly, the literature on Islamic banking tends to focus
upon discussing the Shariah differences between conventional and Islamic banking activities. In
so doing the literature overlooks an important key difference between the two banking paradigms.
Namely, an Islamic bank does not need to go through the same structural and operational
complexities that a conventional bank does when lending to SMEs. This is indeed due to the
unique structure of its lending contract (i.e. Murabaha) and organisational structure. Unlike
conventional bank loans, the Islamic bank’s Murabaha contract (cost plus mark-up)∗ does not
require an Islamic bank to set up a relationship banking system nor employ specialist personnel to
deal with SMEs. In fact, there is no juristic Shariah reason that requires discrimination between
the lending processes to large or small firms. Controversially, doing so may be considered as a
violation to the Shariah law that refrains discrimination.
The Murabaha contract resembles an Asset Based Lending (ABL) contract, however, in a
reverse mode. The collateral asset† is created by signing a lending agreement between the bor-
rower and the Islamic bank. In other words, it creates a collateral-by-contract to the borrower
(Shaban et al, 2014). This allows Islamic bank to avoid the high due diligence cost and evalu-
ation errors of the asset since the contract is based on an indisputable market value of a new
asset. Islamic bank can undertake the process of contacting the vendor directly to receive the
purchasing quota (price=market value) or delegate the process to the buyer (borrower). This
feature, in particular, has a diminishing implication on Islamic bank’s cost compared to the
conventional counterpart. It is common knowledge both in the literature and in the banking
industry that the cost (monitoring and due diligence) associated with the ABL ‡ is higher than
the relationship lending in a conventional banking context. Unlike Murabaha contracts lend-
ing, ABLs are mainly used by a borrower to finance working capital rather than new capital
investment.
The literature on lending elaborates that the presence of collateral in a lending agreement
has an implication on banks’ cost, the period after which the bank grants the loan and the
risk perception of the bank. The collateral is perceived as a substitute of the actual risk of the
borrower. This may incite banks to perform less screening for the projects they finance (Manove,
Padilla and Pagano, 2001). According to Rajan and Winton (1995) and Longhofer and Santos
(2000) collateral is regarded as a complement to the screening and monitoring activities by
the bank. Further, Rajan and Winton (1995) argue that the bank may have less incentive to
monitor the borrower regardless of his business condition, if the value of the collateral is too high
relative to the bank’s claim. The collateral requirements are negatively related to the duration
of bank-borrower relationship (Boot and Thakor, 1994).
The above discussion infers that the process of lending to SMEs through a Murabaha lending
contract is likely to be both shorter and comprises lesser cost to the Islamic bank compared to
relationship lending in a conventional bank. This, in turn, will have a cost-efficiency implication
for Islamic banks. Moreover, the Murabaha lending product can clearly be recognised by SMEs
∗The Murabaha contract is a sale where both the cost of the asset and the profit margin are disclosed to the
buyer. According to the Murabaha contract, the client knows exactly the cost of the asset and the selling price
that the banks will charge – hence the notion of “cost plus mark-up”. For example, Islamic bank will buy the
asset that the client wishes to acquire for say $10,000 and sell it to the client for a different amount, say $15,000.
†Note that the asset is bought from the vendor by the Islamic bank and then sold to the customer with mark-up
‡During the last 10 years ABLs gained the reputation from many in the industry as “gutter banking” and
as a lending vehicle best avoided. This stigma extended to companies that used it as well. The companies that
were looking for ABLs were perceived as companies with bad credit, strapped for cash and incapable of gaining
funding from traditional sources.
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borrowers as a differentiated product. The fact that lack of collateral (Voordeckers and Steijvers,
2006), managerial experience (Martin and Staines, 1994) and information asymmetry (Binks et
al., 1992) are factors that, individually or collectively, may hinder SMEs lending in a conventional
banking paradigm. The Murabaha contract is in effect potentially more convenient and rather
appealing to SMEs borrowers.
In this paper we analyse the lending to SMEs by an Islamic bank and a conventional bank
using a model for a differentiated duopoly developed by Singh and Vives (1984) and Zanchettin
(2006). Section 2 outlines the model and its parameterisation in a banking context. Section 3
discusses a Bertrand equilibrium setting whereby Islamic and non-Islamic banks compete over
the effective rate of interest charged. Results in this section establish a theoretical basis for
the recently observed dramatic growth in Islamic banking and financial products. Section 4
discusses a Cournot equilibrium context whereby in a second stage of competition Islamic and
non-Islamic banks compete over market share. We show that competition over market share
reduces the total funding available via Islamic financial products to SMEs. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider the model by Singh and Vives (1984) and Zanchettin (2006). A representative SME
has a strcitly concave quadratic utility function U of the two lending products l1 (represents a
loan from an Islamic bank) and l2 (represents a loan from a conventional lending bank) and a
linear function of a numeraire good, m
U = α1l1 + α2l2 − 1
2
(
l21 + l
2
2 + 2γl1l2
)− (1 + r1)l1 − (1 + r2)l2, (1)
where r1 denotes the effective interest rate charged by the Islamic bank and r2 denotes the
interest rate charged by the non-Islamic bank. Religious considerations in Islamic banking
forbid the charging of interest. However, a pre-determined effective interest rate can be charged
that is still Shariah compliant (Chong and Liu, 2009). The parameter 0≤γ≤1 in (1) represents
the degree of product differentiation or alternatively the extent to which the Islamic and the
non-Islamic bank exert an influence over each other. If γ = 0 both banks operate as monopolists
in independent markets (Zanchettin, 2006). If γ = 1 both lending products are identical. Despite
some notable similarities between Islamic and non-Islamic banking practices (Chong and Liu,
2009) the case γ = 1 does not appear to be economically or financially meaningful. In the sequel
we focus upon the case 0 < γ < 1. The parameters α1 and α2 denote the extent to which the
loans lead to meaningful economic activity.
The utility function in (1) generates the following system of linear demand functions:
li =
1
1− γ2 [αi − 1− ri − γ(αj − 1− rj)] [i, j = 1, 2; i6=j]. (2)
In the case where γ < 1 this can be inverted to give
ri = αi − li − γlj − 1. (3)
In terms of the supply side of the market the Islamic and non-Islamic banks offer loan products
l1 and l2 respectively. Both banks face a linear cost function with marginal costs c1 < α1 and
c2 < α2. Thus the cost of the loans is assumed to be less than the value of the economic activity
that the lending supports.
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A win-win situation? Suppose that the SME has to wait time T1 from the Islamic bank
and time T2 from the non-Islamic bank before accessing fund. The structure of the Murabaha
contract is such that it is assumed that T1 < T2 (see Section 1). Suppose that g represents the
growth rate associated with a project funded by the loan and T denotes the completion time
of the project. This delay in accessing funds gives rise to the following SME opportunity cost
(O-C):
O-C1 = e
gT − eg(T−T1), O-C2 = egT − eg(T−T2) and O-C1 < O-C2. (4)
The potential win-win situation is illustrated by looking at the cost from the bank’s perspective.
Suppose that the bank’s monitoring cost function is given by
ci = Fixed Cost
[
e−λCollateral
]
. (5)
The cost function in equation (5) abstracts important real-world cost implications of collateral-
based lending (Rajan and Winton, 1995). Further, from equation (5) and the discussion of
collateral-based lending in Section 1 it follows that we must have
c1 < c2. (6)
Suppose further that the monitoring structure and the potential benefits associated with the
Murabaha contract, collateral, managerial control and lack of information asymmetry, may also
lead to a higher growth rate, g1 > g2 say. However, it is assumed that the additional growth
benefits are relatively modest g1 < g2T2/T1 say. In this case the associated opportunity cost
satisfies a modified version of equation (4) with
O-C1 = e
g1T − eg1(T−T1), O-C2 = eg2T − eg2(T−T2) and O-C1 < O-C2. (7)
Further, the economic value of the associated loans satisfies
α1 = e
g1(T−T1) > α2 = eg2(T−T2). (8)
Equation (8) also means that we may assume that αi > 1 so that borrowing at a zero rate of
interest would generate positive economic activity. In the sequel equations (6) and (8) motivate
two natural considerations of interest:
1. Pure cost advantage α1 = α2 = α, c1 < c2.
2. Additional quality advantage α1 > α2 = α, c1 < c2.
3 First-stage competition over price
In this section we analyse lending behaviour by the Islamic and non-Islamic banks in a Bertrand
competition framework when the two banks compete over price. We have the following prelim-
inary proposition.
Proposition 1 In the Bertrand equilibrium the market share of the Islamic bank is given by
l1
l1 + l2
=
2α1 − α2γ + γc2 + (γ2 − 2)c1 − α1γ2
[2− γ − γ2][α1 + α2 − c1 − c2] . (9)
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The following propositions establish a theoretical basis by which Islamic banks can gain a
foothold in the lending market to SMEs.
Proposition 2 If they enjoy a pure cost advantage then the equilibrium market share of the
Islamic bank is strictly positive.
Proposition 3 As the quality advantage increases the market share of the Islamic bank in-
creases.
Propositions 2-3 above outline a clear theoretical basis for Islamic banks to enjoy substantial
market share in the lending market to SMEs. Proposition 4 gives a stronger result and outlines
conditions under which, in principle, the Islamic bank can dominate the entire market. This
result motivates the question of a second-stage competition over market share discussed in
Section 4.
Proposition 4 If c2 > cThresh where
CThresh = α2 − α(α1 − c1)
2− γ2 (10)
then in Bertrand equilibrium the market share of the non-Islamic bank is zero. With a pure cost
advantage
CThresh =
α[2− γ2 − c1 − α]
2− γ2 (11)
Religious considerations in Islamic banking forbid the charging of interest. However, a pre-
determined effective interest rate can be charged that is still Shariah compliant (Chong and Liu,
2009). Net interest (returns) charged by Islamic banks are discussed in Ahmed (2002) with the
maximum interest rate being 21.4%. Suppose that that we have the constraint r1≤rmax. The
implications this has for long-run market share under price competition are described below.
Proposition 5 In the long-run the market share of the Islamic bank satisfies
(i) [Best case scenario]
l1
l1 + l2
≤α1 − α2γ + γ(1 + r2)− 1
(1− γ)[α1 + α2 − 2− r2]
(ii) [Worst case scenario]
l1
l1 + l2
≥α1 − α2γ + γ(1 + r2)− (1 + rmax)
(1− γ)[α1 + α2 − 2− rmax − r2] .
4 Second-stage competition over market share
We analyse market share in a Cournot equilibrium whereby both Islamic and non-Islamic banks
compete over market share. In our model this represents an important second stage of com-
petition whereby non-Islamic banks may respond to losing substantial market share as seems
possible given both the recent growth in Islamic finance and the theoretical results laid out in
Section 3.
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Proposition 6 In Cournot equilibrium we have that
l1 =
2α1 − γα2 + γc2 − 2c1
4− γ2 ; l2 =
2α2 − γα1 + γc1 − 2c2
4− γ2 .
In the sequel we examine welfare considerations and ask if a second-stage competition over
market share may lead to the reduced availability for alternative Islamic banking products for
SMEs. From an economic perspective this reduces to a comparison of the properties of Bertrand
and Cournot equilibria (Singh and Vives, 1984; Zanchettin, 2006). From the model laid out in
Section 2 it follows that the total Islamic banking loans is given by l1 + γl2. In the sequel we
concentrate on the case α1 = α2. Considering both the wider context and notable similarities
between Islamic and non-Islamic bank lending (Chong and Liu 2009) this seems to be the most
financially and economically realistic.
The following proposition suggests that if Islamic and non-Islamic banks compete under
market share, then the amount of alternative Islamic finance available as loans to SMEs may be
reduced.
Proposition 7 Under Cournot equilibrium the total amount of Islamic finance loans available
to SMEs is reduced.
5 Conclusions
Bank lending to SMEs seems to be tailor made for Islamic banking practises based around
relationship lending as opposed to other more conventional forms of debt financing. A key com-
petitive benefit of this approach is a pure cost advantage brought about by reduced monitoring
costs. However, the nature of the contract may also provide opportunities for enhanced growth
and an additional quality advantage based around the holding of collateral, greater managerial
experience and reduced information asymmetries.
Islamic banking and the use of Islamic financial products has increased significantly in recent
years. By using a model for a differentiated duopoly, Sections 2-3 lay out a theoretical foundation
for this observed phenomenon. A pure cost advantage should provide Islamic banks a foothold in
the market for lending to SMEs. An additional quality advantage means that this advantage can
be more intense in the sense that the market share of Islamic banks could increase dramatically in
principle capturing the whole of the market. However, our model predicts that in a second-stage
Islamic and non-Islamic banks will compete over market share. This has important implications
for policy and for development finance as it is predicted that in competing for market share the
amount of Islamic finance lending available to SMEs will decrease.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Propostion 1
Each firm chooses ri to maximise
Profit = [Price− Cost]×Quantity of loans
= [1 + ri − ci]li
= [1 + ri − ci] 1
1− γ2 [αi − 1− ri − γ(αj − 1− rj)]
∝ ri
1− γ2 [αi − 1− γ(αj − 1− rJ)− 1 + ci]−
r2i
1− γ2
Differentiating and equating to zero gives
ri =
αi − 1− γ(αj − 1− rj) + ci − 1
2
. (12)
So
[4− γ2]r1 = 2α1 − 2− 2α2γ + 2γ + α2γ − γ − α1γ2 + γ2 + γc2 − γ + 2c1 − 2
= 2α1 − α2γ − α1γ2 + γ2 − 4 + γc2 + 2c1
r1 =
2α1 − α2γ − α1γ2 + γ2 − 4 + γc2 + 2c1
4− γ2
r1 =
2α1 + γc2 + 2c1 − α2γ − α1γ2
4− γ2 − 1 (13)
By symmetry
r2 =
2α2 + γc1 + 2c2 − α1γ − α2γ2
4− γ2 − 1. (14)
Differentiating (1) and equating to zero it follows that
l1 = α1 − γl2 − (1 + r1) (15)
l2 = α2 − γl1 − (1 + r2). (16)
Combining equations (13-16) it follows that
l1 =
2α1 − α2γ + γc2 + (γ2 − 2)c1 − α1γ2
(4− γ2)(1− γ2) . (17)
By symmetry
l2 =
2α2 − α1γ + γc1 + (γ2 − 2)c2 − α2γ2
(4− γ2)(1− γ2) . (18)
The stated result follows noting that when forming the fractions l1/(l1 + l2) the denominators
will cancel. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
In this case the market share of the Islamic bank given by equation (9) becomes
l1
l1 + l2
=
α(2− γ) + γc2 + (γ2 − 2)c1
2α− c1 − c2
>
α(2− γ) + γc1 + (γ2 − 2)c1
2α− c1 − c2
=
−(γ2 + γ − 2)(α− c1)
2α− c1 − c2 ≥0.

Proof of Proposition 3
Let α2 = α and assume that α1 > α. The market share of the Islamic bank given by equation
(9) becomes
l1
l1 + l2
=
2α1 − αγ + γc2 + (γ2 − 2)c1 − α1γ2
[2− γ − γ2][α1 + α− c1 − c2] . (19)
Differentiating (19) we have that
∂
∂α1
(
l1
l1 + l2
)
=
[2 + γ − γ2](α− c2)
[2− γ − γ2]2[α1 + α− c1 − c2] > 0. (20)

Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that the market share of the non-Islamic bank is 0. It follows from (18) that
0 = 2α2 − α1γ + γc1 + (γ2 − 2)c2 − α2γ2,
c2(γ
2 − 2) = α2γ2 + α1γ − γc1 − 2α2,
c2 = α2 − γ(α1 − c1)
2− γ2 .
Since by equation (18) the market share is a decreasing function of c2 the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5
From equations (15-16) the market share of the Islamic bank satisfies
l1
l1 + l2
=
α1 − α2γ + γ(1 + r2)− (1 + r1)
(1− γ)[α1 + α2 − 2− r1 − r2] . (21)
The function given by equation (21) is a decreasing function of r1. Using r1≥0 it follows that
l1
l1 + l2
≤α1 − α2γ + γ(1 + r2)− 1
(1− γ)[α1 + α2 − 2− r2]
Similarly, using r1≤rmax it follows that
l1
l1 + l2
≥α1 − α2γ + γ(1 + r2)− (1 + rmax)
(1− γ)[α1 + α2 − 2− rmax − r2] .
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Proof of Proposition 6
Under Cournot each bank chooses li to maximise
[Price-Cost]×Quantity = [αi − li − γlj − ci]li
Differentiating and equating to zero gives
l1 =
α1 − γl2 − c1
2
; l2 =
α2 − γl1 − c1
2
. (22)
Solve (22) to give
l1 =
2α1 − γα2 + γc2 − 2c1
4− γ2 ; l2 =
2α2 − γα1 + γc1 − 2c2
4− γ2 . (23)

Proof of Proposition 7
Under Bertrand equilibrium it follows from equations (13) and (15-16) that the total Islamic
finance lending to SMEs is given by
Bloans = l1 + γl2 = α− (1 + r1) = 2α+ αγ − 2c1 − γc2
4− γ2 .
Under a Cournot equilibrium it follows from (23) that the total Islamic finance lending to SMEs
is given by
Cloans = l1 + γl2 =
2α+ αγ − γc2 + (γ2 − 2)c1 − αγ2
4− γ2
= Bloans +
γ2c1 − αγ2
4− γ2
< Bloans since α > c1.
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